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Abstract 
This paper has the dual objectives to highlight some of the factors that account for the 
absence of ethnic tensions and conflict in Botswana since independence and to reflect on the 
future of ethnic relations in the country. It identfles factors such as the nature of ethnic 
relations during the colonial period, the nature of British indfrect rule, the relatively even 
development across regions occupied by different ethnic groups, deliberate government efforts 
to create national as opposed to tribal consciousness and the institutions of chieftaincy as 
having contributed to harmonious ethnic relations. An examinatn of the current situation, 
however, points to emerging disintegrative ethnic consciousness. This is evident from three 
factors: I) The political debates centred on ethnic representation in the House of Chiefs and 
the fairness of sections 77, 78, and 79 of the Constitution that are sweeping across the 
country; 2) the appointment of a Presidential Commission to review sections 77, 78 and 79 of 
the Constitution, and 3) the focus the subject of ethnicity has received in the print ,?ledia. It is 
concluded that Botswana is no longer safe from the ethnic strjfe, tensions and conflicts that 
have engulfed most other Africa countries, unless deliberate corrective measures are adopted 
by the state, drawing from other African countries to ident5.' what works and what does not 
work. 
Introduction 
The term ethnicity refers to the consciousness of a feeling or an awareness of 
being a member of a distinctive ethnic group. The members of an ethnically 
conscious group conceive of themselves as having a distinct identity due to 
common historical origins (Mare, 1993; Kiyanga-Mulindwa, 1994: 1). They 
are characterized by a feeling of "we-ness" and display a "sense of 
peoplehood" and of the "corporate aspect" of sectarian affiliation (Horowitz 
1985: 51). Ethnicity, broadly defined, is not new to Africa. It has been a 
persistent fact of life that predates the occupation of Africa by peoples of 
European descent. The continent is, in fact, the most varied and ethnically 
complex of all the world's continents. With the exception of Lesotho, Somalia 
and Swaziland, all African states, as we know them today, incorporate 
ethnically distinctive communities (United Nations, 1994) occupying different 
M. 
regions within them. A state like Nigeria, for example, is home to as many as 
250 distinct ethnic groups (Osaghae, 1991). 
The onset of colonialism appears to have transformed the nature and 
magnitude of ethnic consciousness across most of Africa. Pre-colonial Africa 
was characterized by limited to local, small-scale inter-ethnic disputes and 
conflicts (Mair, 1977; Krymkowski and Hall, 1990) which rarely escalated 
into prolonged hafred, tensions and donflicts culminating in the kind of 
genocide witnessed by some nations since independence. However, the 
ciming of colonial rule ushered in a new dawn in ethnic relations in which 
disintegrative ethnicity assumed prominence over positive ethnicity (Leys, 
1975; Nkrumah, 1980; Munyae and Mulinge, 1999). As Nkrumah (1980: 59) 
asserts, tribes but not "tribalism" in the modern sense existed in Africa before 
imperialist penetration. But 'tribalism arose from colonialism...' As 
disintegrative ethnicity eclipsed its integrative counterpart, it set the stage for 
persistent ethnic tensions and conflicts even among groups that at one time 
co-existed peacefully. 
This essay focuses on the question of ethnicity within the context of Botswana. 
Botswana is a landlocked semi-arid country boarded by Zambia to the North, 
Zimbabwe in the Northeast, South Africa in the South and East, and Namibia 
in the West. Although the country gained independence in 1966 as one of the 
poorest nations in the world, the discovery of diamonds in 1967, prudent 
economic management, financial discipline, good governance, peace and 
stability, and public sector development planning have seen Botswana achieve 
remarkable development (Good, 1994; Maipose and Somolekae, 1996; 
Maipose, 2003). The favorable economic growth has enabled the government 
to invest extensively in the social sector, thereby increasing accessibility of 
social services to the majority of its population (Mandlebe, 1997; Mpabanga, 
1997). Although the government has taken initiatives to diversify the economy 
through manufacturing and other business enterprises, diamond mining 
remains the dominant economic activity, and the country continues to suffer 
from the absence of a viable private sector (Maipose, 2003). Thus, given the 
capital rather than labour intensive nature of the mining sector, the bulk of 
Batswana who are .formally employed work for the public sector. However, 
the country's population remains overwhelmingly rural, dependent mainly on 
cattle rearing and beef production for a livelihood, with large cattle barons 
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rather than small-scale holders dominating the sector. 
Compared to most other Africa countries, Botswana presents a rather unique 
case with respect to ethnic relations. Like other African countries, the country 
comprises multiple ethnic groups. However, unlike most other African 
countries, where ethnicity has had disintegrative tendencies by creating 
conditions for competition and animoSities between groups, until the late 
1990s   Botswana was characterized by integrative ethnicity in which ethnic 
groups co-existed as equals (Holm and Molutsi, 1992) and devoid of 
arrogance on the part of any particular group. Until then the country was 'free 
of divisive struggles that surround ethnically based politics' (Solway, 1994: 
225) and enjoyed political stability and a relative peaceful co-existence 
between its different ethnic groups. Despite such uniqueness, little efforts have 
been made to identify the factors which are responsible for relative ethnic 
peace, and to analyze the future of ethnic relations in the country. This essay is 
a step in that direction. It advances the position that potential for ethnic 
animosities and resentment in Botswana remains real. Thus, it would be rather 
myopic to conclude that the ethnic unity and harmony that has characterized 
the country since independence is likely to prevail well into the distant future. 
While the country may have experienced a delay in the emergence of the 
socioeconomic and political conditions that have been responsible for soured 
ethnic relations in the rest of Africa, there are already indications that the wind 
of ethnic relations in Botswana is changing course. 
Ethnic relations in Botswana 
Like most other African countries Botswana is an ethnically heterogeneous 
nation. However, the country presents a rather unique case with respect to the 
nature and extent of ethnicity in two ways. First, unlike in most other African 
countries Botswana is characterized by constitutionally •grounded ethnic 
differentiation. The constitution of Botswana delineates eight "principal tribes" 
- namely, the Bangwato, Bangwaketse, Bakwena, Bakgatla; Batawana, 
Barolong, Balete afid Batlokwa - for the country. These were demarcated 
between 1899 and • 1933 as the "principal tribes" through a Native Reserve 
Delimitation Commission. The Commission established "native reserves" in 
Bechuanaland that consolidated the subordination of non-Batswana ethnic 
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groups. In addition, the Commission marked the boundaries of seven native 
reserves plus the Barolong farms, with the rest of the country becoming 
"Crown Land" or "freehold land" (Schapera, 1943). Groups that were located 
outside the native reserves, e.g. in Kgalagadi, Ghanzi and Chobe, among 
others, were declared squatters on Crown land. At independence., Botswana's 
new constitution enshrined the eight Botswana groups occupying the native 
reserves. It retained the boundaries of the native reserves under the new label 
of "district". Because of this arrangement, chiefs of ethnic groups other than 
the eight major tribes continued to be marginalized. They were regarded as 
headmen or sub-chiefs without the right to represent their people (tribesmen) 
in the House of Chiefs (Molutsi, 1998). 
Second, despite the existence of constitutionally legitimated ethnic 
differentiation, Botswana, unlike most other African countries, has 
experienced relative peace and harmony among its ethnic groups and the near 
total absence of disintegrative ethnicity since independence. While in most 
other African countries the existence of multiple ethnic groups has often been 
accompanied by ethnic tensions that have resulted in open hostility, conflict or 
murderous wars and even genocide, in Botswana ethnic consciousness and 
tensions have not been apparent. No conflict of the magnitude and devastating 
nature found in some other African countries has been witnessed here. The 
cOuntry has never experienced apparent tensions and conflict between groups, 
and has also been devoid of aggravating ethnic competition for political and 
sdcioeconomic resources. It is the competition for resources that has been 
responsible for discord between ethnic groups and for the entrenchment of 
practices such as the coalescing of political parties along ethnic lines and 
voting in ethnic blocks in other African countries (Wilson, 1995). 
Ethnicity in politics in Botswana exists, but it is not as blatant as in some other 
African countries. That is, ethnicity is not the most important variable in 
Botswana's political process, as it has become in countries like Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, and Malawi, to name but a few. Although ethnicity plays a role in 
party membership, it is by no means the paramount factor. In Botswana 
political support alOng ethnic lines mainly exists in rural areas, where victory 
for political parties .may be based more on ethnic constituencies than on other 
factors. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), for example, has dominated 
the politics of Botswana because of its ethnically grounded rural support. 
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Nevertheless, ethnic allegiance to political parties in Botswana is not driven by 
inherent ethnic competition for scarce national resources, like in other African 
countries. Across most of Africa, the primary purpose for people of similar 
ethnicity to join the same political party is to increase the group's chance of 
ascending the presidency and influencing national development policy 
decisions. For Botswana it would be more correct to argue that political parties 
have coalesced along a rural-urban dichotomy: The Botswana National Front 
[BNF] is mainly the party of the urban residents, whereas the Botswana 
Democratic Party [BDP] is the party of the (rural) masses; at least at the level 
of ordinary membership. 
Referring specifically to voting patterns, Molutsi (1998:366-67) indicates that, 
"communities in Botswana have voted for local leaders based on ethnic 
identity rather than for national leaders and national issues." He argues that 
both minority tribes (such as the Bakalanga, Subia, Humbukushi, Yei 
Mabanderu and Basarawa) and majority Batswana tribes have all voted for 
ethnic leadership. What distinguishes the Botswana situation from other 
African countries is that here voting along ethnic lines has occurred for 
reasons different from those in other countries. In countries such as Kenya 
voting along ethnic lines by minority tribes has been driven by the desire to 
control the presidency and therefore the national agenda and resources. In 
Botswana, on the contrary, minority triles have had to vote along ethnic lines 
because most of these groups found themselves residing in geographical 
tetritories occupied by one or another of the major ethnic groups (Molutsi, 
1998). This type of arrangement is said to have led to the assimilation, 
subordination and subjugation of the majority groups. Furthermore, chiefs who 
represent tribal interests play a major role in influencing voting patterns in 
rural Botswana. Because of this, people are inclined to vote for the party their 
chief is sympathetic to. For instance, people vote for the BDP on account of its 
being the party of their chief, Sir Seretse Khama (Molutsi, 1998). It is on the 
strength of this fact that the BDP decided to co-opt and appoint to the position 
of Vice President Ian Khama, the first son of Sir Seretse Khama, just before 
the 1999 elections, with a view to strengthening party unity and improving its 
prospects for winning the elections. The move, aided by a split in the 
opposition, appears to have paid dividends, as the BDP regained much of the 
ground it had lost to the opposition BNF during the 1994 elections. 
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Why the Harmonious Ethnic Relations in Botswana? 
Logically, the establishment of native reserves and the consequent 
subordination of non-Tswana tribes by Tswana groups during the. colonial 
period, and the existence of constitutionally legitimated ethnic inequalities 
after independence should have prepared the ground for ethnic tensions and 
conflict in Botswana. But it was not until towards the end of the 1990s that 
evidence of ethnic tension and competition began to surface in the country. 
This raises the question of what reasons may have caused this delay. There are 
seyeral explanations that can be advanced to account for the relative ethnic 
'unity', peace, and harmony that characterized Botswana since independence. 
These include historical factors such as the nature of ethnic relations during 
the colonial period and the nature of indirect rule employed by the British 
colonizers. In addition, economic factors, such as the relatively equal 
distribution and access to resources have had a role to play. 
Historically, ethnic relations in Botswana were characterized by the 
assimilation, subordination and subjugation of minority by majority ethnic 
groups (Molutsi, 1998). Minority group such as Bakalanga, Subia, 
Humbukushi, Yei Mabanderu and Basarawa who found themselves sharing 
geographical territories with any of the majority groups (the Bangwato, 
Bangwaketse, BakWena, Bakgatla, Batawana, Barolong, Balete and Batlokwa) 
were presumed to have become the subjects of the host majority tribe. As 
such, they were considered to have forsaken their consciousness as distinctive 
ethnic groups and to have become assimilated to the majority group. Although 
one may question the authenticity of the assimilation argument, one is likely to 
be persuaded to believe that the absence of friction and conflict between 
minority and majority groups suggests that minority groups did not perceive 
themselves to be disadvantaged. That is, no master-slave situation existed and 
the level of differential treatment of minority by majority groups was minimal. 
The historically grounded harmonious ethnic relations in Botswana were 
strengthened further by the system of indirect rule adopted by the British. The 
British had no economic interest in Bechuanaland. Their only goal was to 
maintain access to their territories in the North, especially the two Rhodesias. 
This reduced their physical presence in the country. Hence, unlike in other 
African countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe, Botswana escaped the ethnic 
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fragmentation and conflict associated with the British administrative practice 
of divide and rule. British colonialism also did not engineer and actively 
promote any paramount/favourite tribe in Botswana, as it did in its other 
colonies oin the continent. Although some supremacy was created through the 
demarcation of native reserves from 1899 to 1933, as indicated earlier, this 
never assumed the social, economic and political undertones associated with 
ethnic domination in other British colonies. 
Generally, as has been demonstrated by Vail (1996) and Wilmsen (1996), the 
source of ethnic tension and conflict is the unequal access to national 
resources among groups Whenever ethnicity becomes the basis for the 
allocation of important societal resources such as power, economic 
development programs, political influence, and positions in the general labour 
market (Ungar, 1989; United Nations, 1994), it engenders rivalry, tension and 
conflict and, in extreme cases, even may result in armed struggle and even 
genocide. In Botswana, resource allocation did not constitute the basis for 
ethnic tension until very recently, because of three factors. First, the British 
never attached any economic value to Bechuanaland. As a result, they did not 
invest in the socioeconomic development of the country and the country 
attained independence without regional variations in development along 
ethnic lines that could constitute a basis for competition among groMps. The 
overwhelmingly rural population depended mainly on agriculture for their 
livelihood (Botswana Government, 1991, 1997). The whole ci ountry was 
equally underdeveloped, access to education was limited and did not 
deliberately favor some tribes at the expense of others. 
Second, being one of the poorest nations in Africa at independence, land 
remained the dominant resource in Botswana. But the system of tenure 
allowed access to land for every adult Motswana. As such, land did not 
constitute a basis for ethnic competition. Ownership of land in Botswana takes 
three forms; freehold, tribal and state land. Tribal land refers to land which 
used to be held and administered by the chiefs of the various tribes prior to the 
passing of the Tribal Land Act of 1968 which transferred control and 
allocation of such lands to Land Boards. These are corporate bodies whose 
membership comprises of the chief (as ex officio) and representatives .from the 
district council and central government. Citizens (i.e., nationals) can apply to 
the Land Board to bp allocated land for residence, agriculture (often referred to 
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as the lands), for livestock rearing (termed cattle post) or for commercial 
purposes. Relative fairness has prevailed in the distribution of employment 
opportunities in that access to employment has mainly been based on merit 
rather than on ethnic affiliation. 
Finally, Botswana has recorded impressive economic growth since the 
discovery and exploitation of valuable minerals, particularly diamonds 
(Botswana Government, 1991, 1997). This has created increasing revenue that 
has enabled the government to provide better services to the poiulation. The 
efficiency in the prvision of such services has been enhanced by the village 
system of rural . settlement which •concentrates rather than disperses 
populations geographically. While the overall level of poverty has been rising 
in Botswana and some regional variations in development are becoming 
evident, one may argue that, relative to most other African countries, there is 
some semblance of equality in the "village" distribution of national resources. 
Persistent harmonious ethnic relations in Botswana could also be explained in 
terms of deliberate government efforts to create a unifying national 
consciousness. The postcolonial state has tried to suppress ethnic divisions by 
deliberately excluding ethnic identity from official records and especially 
national censuses. Unlike in most other African countries, where ethnic 
identity remains a major category in national censuses (Mulinge and Munyae, 
2000), the Central Statistics Office in Botswana which oversees population 
enumeration, steers I clear of gathering information that may reflect ethnic 
identities and languages, as a matterS of government policy. In addition, 
ethnicity has never constituted a major category in official government 
documents such as national identity cards (omangs), passports and driver 
licenses. The state has also pursued an aggressive policy of Tswana 
assimilation through its official language and culture policy. In the interest of 
nation-building and national unity, Setswana and English are the only official 
languages in the country. Other languages can neither be spoken at official 
forums, nor be taught in schools (Holm and Molutsi, 1992, Molutsi, 1998). 
This approach is not unique to Botswana. It has been attempted in other 
African countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, but with. limited success 
(Smith, 1981; Birch, 1989). 
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Finally, the institution of chieftaincy in Botswana has been considered to be 
one of the factors responsible for the ethnic peace that has existed up to the 
post-independence period. According to Hoim (1996), this averted ethnic 
conflict by keeping ethnicity localized. Broadly construed this may be the 
case, but on closer scrutiny, there are indications that the nature of the 
chieftaincy institution in Botswana creates fertile ground for ethnic divisions 
by elevating the chiefs of the eight principal tribes to a status of supremacy 
while relegating those of the minority non-Tswana tribes to headmen and 
sub-chief status. Given that only chiefs from the eight maj or tribes sit in the 
House of Chiefs, minority tribes are denied direct representation by fellow 
tribesmen. In some parts of the country this has culminated in the emergence 
of what Solway (1994) referred to as 'politicized ethnicity.' 
The future ethnic relations in Botswana 
Although no major ethnic rifts have occurred in Botswana since independence, 
the country is displaying signs of cultural and ethnic challenges comparable to 
those in many other African countries. These provide evidence that Botswana 
is beginning to travel the path followed by most African countries during the 
colonial period. A front-page article printed in the Botswana Guardian of 
October 6, 2000 entitled "Tribal Wars" best sums up the situation. In an 
attempt to answer the question as to whether Botswana is on the brink of a 
national meltdown, the article pointed out that: 
Stress levels are rising as ethnic tensions hot up. Tribal rivalry is getting 
organized: the country's middle class is mobilizing around ethnic affiliations 
in the ongoing debate over the planned amendment to the Constitution to 
make it tribally neutral. Botswana's middle class national camaraderie - "the 
Old boys club" - is breaking down and tribal cabals are springing up in its 
place. At the University of Botswana, old friendships are being stretched to 
the limit by tribal rivalry. Yesterday's professional colleagues are today's 
tribal rivals. Old ethnic divisions in the country's business community are 
being fossilized, parastatal chiefs and senior government officials have also 
been dragged into the fray. 
There are three key pointers to emerging ethnic tensions and competition in 
Botswana. These include the debates surrounding tribal representation in the 
House of Chiefs, the debates focusing on sections 77, 78, and 79 of the 
constitution, and the proliferation of media stories focusing on the subject. It is 
to a more detailed discussion of these that we now turn. 
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Debates about Representation in the House of Chiefs 
Political debates surrounding tribal representation in the House of Chiefs - the 
second house in Botswana's legislative structure - began in 1999. Tribes of the 
so-termed subject (or minority) groups were clamoring for recognition as 
distinctive entities and for representation in the House of Chiefs which plays 
mainly an advisory role in the country's politics. They called for the expansion 
of the House of Chiefs to incorporate chiefs from all  tribs in the country. 
Minority tribes also desired their chiefs to be referr4 to as "paramount", like 
those of the constitutionally delineated eight major tribes. Political 
representatives from these groups elevated such demands to the national level 
forums by frequently raising them in the National Assembly and debating 
them in Kgotla (a public meeting or community council headed by the village 
chief in which community decisions are arrived at by consensus) and political 
gatherings. In addition, members of parliament and ordinary citizens from 
subject groups such as the Kalánga, Bakgalagadi and Bayeyi were demanding 
the recognition of their languages (vernacilars). They called for these to be 
used in national print and broadcast media and to be taught in schools where 
currently, only Setswana is taught. Although the debaths have since lost steam, 
the matters raised have not been resolved and are likely to surface again in the 
future. . 
Political debates centering around sections 77, 78, and 79 of the 
Constitution 
The second pointer to rising ethnic relationsjemperatures in ethnic relations 
were the debates questioning the legality of sections 77; 78, and 79 of the 
Bo.tswana constitution, which delineate eight principal tribes for the country, 
labelling them as discriminatory. These debates, manifesting a grosing 
discontent with the constitutional status quo in Botswana, peaked in 1999. In 
recognition of the divisive potentials of these debates and of the rising ethnic 
temperatures in the country, the government appointed the Balopi Commission 
of Inquiry with the objective to so1icit views from the public concernihg the 
three sections, and to suggest a way fbrward. 
The status of ethnic relations in Botswana became evident from the spectrum 
of individuals who chose to express their opinions publicly. Broadly speaking, 
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the debates pitted Tswana-speaking tribes against non-Tswana speaking 
groups, with the former rooting for the status quo and the later agitating for 
change. Participants included senior government officials, parastatal heads, 
academics, prominent business personalities and political party activists. 
Those supporting the status quo subscribed to the view that there is nothing 
amiss with the Botswana constitution. They argued that the constitution of 
Botswana does not discriminate, and those who harboured such ideas had 
misconceptions. According to them the eight major tribes had an acquired 
right to their status. On the other side of t5he debate, those who were opposed 
to sections 77, 78 and 79 of the constitution saw them as dicriminatory, 
because they deliberately excluded the names of non-Tswana tribes in favour 
of the eight listed Tswana groups. They maintained that this constituted the 
basis for persistent discrimination against the rights of those groups to land 
and administration. For this reason, they called for an amendment to the 
constitution to treat all tribes in the country equally and to guarantee that all 
ethnic groups are represented in the House of Chiefs. According to those 
agitating for change, rectifying the constitution would eliminate the "false 
supremacy" that the constitutionally legitimated majority ethnic groups 
enjoyed since independence. This, in turn, would further national unity by 
creating a cohesive, democratic and tolerant nation amidst diversity. 
The findings of the commission reiterated the concern that the three sections 
were discriminatory and recommended that they should be scrapped from the 
constitution (Republic of Botswana, 2000). As a result, a Bill oil Chieftaincy 
was drafted by way of scrapping sections 77, 78, and 79. However, despite the 
president's initial .support of the BilJ and the recommendations of the 
commission, political pressure forced him to shift his stance and promise his 
supporters that the proposed constitutional change was not going to be 
implemented. As a result, no substantive steps have been taken in the direction 
of implementing the recommendations of the Balopi Commission of Inquiry, 
despite the government having accepted its report in 2000. 
Print Media Evidence 
The third indicator of rising ethnic tension in Botswana is the frequency of 
media stories focusing on the subject. Since 1999, there has been an upsurge 
of accusations and counter-accusations on the subject of ethnic belonging in 
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BOtswana in the print media. Newspapers such as The Botswana Gazette, The 
Sun, The Botswana Guardian, Mmegi/The Reporter, and Mmegi Monitor all 
were replete with news items focusing on ethnic relations in Botswana. In our 	 1 
view, the persistent appearance of the topic of ethnicity in the print media was 
an indication that ethnic relations in Botswana were assuming the status of a 
major social issue meriting the attention of the public. Even the 
government-controlled newspaper, The Daily News, which is distributed freely 
to citizens, was not left out in the rush to profile the ethnicity debate. 
At the general level the print media have carried numerous calls on Batswana 
to put national interests before tribal interests. A letter titled "Remember 
Rwanda and Burundi" appeared in the Botswana Guardian of October 26, 
2001, stating that, "whether you call it tribalism, ethnicity or cultural divisions, 
it is all the same. They all are like cancer that can spread very fast and destroy 
its host very quickly. Right thinking people of our society should strive to root 
out all signs and symptoms of tribalism before it becomes acute and fully 
blown.., everybody who loves peace in this country must by all means avoid 	 4 
casual talk about issues of tribalism." The letter concluded by challenging the 
view that some people rely on ethnicity to access employment, arguing that 
employment and progression in the country were based on merit and capability 	 1 
rather than on ethnic background. Similar sentiments were mirrored in an 
	 4 
article, specifically targeting sections 77, 78 and 79 of the constitution, 
published in The Midweek Sun of May 5, 2002 (p.7). The article cautioned to 
"put the country before your selfish tribal interests" and called for individuals 
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to "swallow your shallow tribal pride and accept that our society is not treating 
all people equally." 
The bulk of the print media evidence, however, focused on the open discontent 
over the ethnic factor in Botswana's labour market, with article after article 
dwelling on the ethnic composition of the workforce in the public service, the 
parastatal sector, and in the private sector, culminating with the conclusion 
that all sectors are dominated by a particular ethnic group. For instance, in an 
open letter published in the Mmegi Monitor newspaperof July 11, 2000 (p. 16) 
	 4 
by a concerned citizen the Bakalanga were accused of being Zimbabweans 
who were using their tribal identity to monopolize economic opportunities and 
public service jobs, and of being hungry for power, compared to 'real' 	 I 
Batswana. The author of the letter gave the examples of corporations such as 
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Dbswana Diamond Mining Company, Botswana Development Corporations, 
and other unnamed private companies to demonstrate that the Bakalanga 
dominated the labour market. 
A closely related article appeared in the Botswana Guardian of July 15, 2002 
(p.3) in which an irate employee at Supreme Furnitures, a subsidiary of the 
Profurn group which operates the retail chains of Supreme, Barnetts, and 
Protea Furnitures, accused the management of corruption, tribalism, and 
favouritism. The author complained that 90 percent of all senior officers in the 
northern region are Bakalanga, a scenario he concluded had resulted in the 
employment of more Bakalanga than any other tribe. The Voice edition of 
July 27, 2002 (pp.  1-2) added its voice to the debate by carrying another story 
pointing to the ethiiic contestation in the labour market. In an article with the 
headline caption, "Bakalanga Accused of Corruption and Nepotism", the 
author dismissed Bakalanga rhetoric of marginalization as meant to conceal 
the fact that they dominate and possess elite status in various spheres of life in 
Botswana. More specifically, the author singles out the ethnic composition of 
the public service, utilizing the judiciary as a case study to drive his point 
home. According to him, of 15 Batswana judges 13 are Bakalanga; the other 
two are from the 8 principal tribes demarcated in the constitution. In lieu of 
this the author concludes that: 
The Bakalanga are well placed in positions of power and influence. Such 
positions allow them to dictate pace of change and infuse their ideas at the 
national level. They have access to strategic information, which they are 
using to entrench their ethnic kind in the social and economic spheres of the 
country. It is the Bakalanga who are marginalizing other ethnic groups, not 
the other way round. 
The accusations labelled against the Bakalanga tribe have not gone 
unanswered. For instance, a member of the Society for the Promotion of the 
Ikalanga Language (SPIL) writing in the Botswana Gazette of August 10, 
2002 (p.4) pointed out that some people were simply jealous of the Bakalanga 
because they are more hard working, and that some tribal bigots who believe 
that they are superior on account of the constitutional provision that the 
Bakalanga have been subjected to cannot stomach the fact that the Bakalanga 
are the most qualified citizens. 
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As an indicator of the gravity of the ethnic question in the labour market in 
Botswana the media has also been replete with a chain of articles calling upon 
Batswana to guard against the divisive tendencies of ethnically inspired bad 
mouthing. Most of the articles in this category called for better education that 
guaranteed that benefits trickled down to all. One such article appeared in The 
Botswana Guardian of September 7, 2001 (p.1  1), emphasizing the importance 
of education in labour market attainments. Its author argues that the Bakalanga 
took to education like ducks to water, while other ethnic groups were not 
particularly enthusiastic about education. He concluded that it was education 
that was responsible for Bakalanga dominance in the various spheres of life in 
Botswana. These views are supported by Werbner (2002) who points out that 
many senior and capable civil servants in Botswana are from the Kalanga 
community because that community heavily agitated for and invested in 
schools during the colonial period. A similar article was printed in The Voice 
of September 7, 2001 (p.  9) in which the author argued that "instead of 
demonizing and bashing the Bakalanga we should be making concerted 
attempts to learn from them ... ethnicity has the potential to undermine 
national unity." 
One may also cite other newspaper articles, such as The Gazette, October 10, 
2001 (p.11), Mmegi Monitor, September 19, 2001 (p. 4), and The Botswana 
Guardian, April 12, 2002 (p.14), to illustrate the upsurge, of the ethnicity 
question in Botswana. In addition, the changing tide in ethnic relations in 
Botswana has been documented by the few academic stud jes that are 
available. For instance, Nyamnjoh (2002:6) pointed to the existence of 
"growing importance of identity politics and more exclusionary ideas of 
nationality and citienship, as minority claims for greater cultural recognition 
and plurality are countered by majoritarian efforts to maintain the status quo of 
an inherited colonial hierarchy of ethnic groups" in the country. 
What the future holds: The role of poverty 
The driving question for this essay is what the future holds regarding ethnic 
relations in Botswana. The ethnic discrimination identified by the various 
debates that have raged since 1999 is an indicator that Botswana is entering a 
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phase in her socioeconomic and political development that is likely to be 
characterized by heightened ethnic consciousness. There is an increasing 
likelihood that the stratification war in Botswana is slowly but surely shifting 
its locus more and more from the gender issue to the ethnic question. Since 
discrimination is a threat to fundamental societal values such as equality of 
opportunity and merit-based advancement, it might be expected that a natural 
tension would arise in the interpretation of interactions involving advantaged 
and disadvantaged group members in Botswana. While advantaged group 
members may be careful to avoid the appearance of condoning discrimination 
and as well as to vehemently deny any charges of impropriety, members of 
the disadvantaged groups might be prone to interpret ambiguous interactions 
as potentially discriminatory. 
Dwindling socioeconomic resources and an emerging socioeconomic trend 
engulfing particularly the ruling elite and the upper and middle class members 
of the society point to future heightened ethnic tensions and competition in 
Botswana. Diminishing socioeconomic resources manifests itself in a number 
of ways, including high poverty rates, rising unemployment rates and limited 
educational places, especially in tertiary institutions. These conditions create 
an environment that increases ethnic competition and elevates the potential for 
tension, hatred/hostility and even conflict to greater heights. While merit and 
need may, in principle, continue to be the basis for the allocation of the 
dwindling socioeconomic resources and opportunities, ethnicity is .likely to 
become an additional credential necessary for one to access certain resources 
such as employment and tertiary educational and training institutions. 
As far as the overall socio-economic situation is concerned, Botswana 
currently is characterized by "poverty in the midst of plenty". The poverty rate 
is. high with a large proportion of the population living below the poverty 
datum line (PDL) (see e.g. Good, 1992; Jefferis, 1997). No current data on the 
extent of poverty in Botswana are available but a study conducted by the 
Botswana Institute of Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA) in 1997 showed 
that 47 percent of Batswana (or 38 percent of all households) were living 
below the poverty threshold of Botswana Pula 100 (approximately 30 US 
dollars) per person per month in 1993/94. Of these, 30 percent were classified 
as "very poor". Based on the Central Intelligence Agency (2008) World 
Factbook, in 2003 the proportion of the population living below the poverty 
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line stood at 30.3 percent. Poverty levels in Botswana vary across the country, 
with remote rural areas having the highest incidences. For instance, South 
West, Kgalagadi, Ghanzi, and the Western parts of Kweneng and Southern 
districts had the highest poverty rates in 1993/94; 71 percent of its population 
was classified as people living below the PDL (Siphambe, 2003). Like in most 
developing countries, poverty in Botswana has a gender dimension: 
Female-headed households are more likely to be poor than their male-headed 
counterparts. This poverty manifests itself through lack of adequate shelter or 
clothing, high mortality and morbidity, poor educational achievement, 
malnutrition, dependency, lack of social and economic mobility, and 
vulnerability to adverse events outside the control of the poor (World Bank, 
2001). In Remote Area Dweller (RAD) settlements, the major indicators of 
poverty are widespread, as are symptoms of apathy, dependency and 
alcoholism. 
There are a number of perceived causes of poverty in Botswana. Topping the 
list is the lack of cash income and the skewed distribution of incomes and 
productive assets (BIDPA, 1997; United Nations, 2002; Siphambe, 2003). 
Direct benefits from mining, the dominant economic sector, have tended to 
accrue only to those in formal employment, and those with the specialist skills 
needed in the mining industry and other parts of the formal sector. Poverty in 
Botswana is also rooted in the country's adverse physical conditions and 
narrow economic base (United Nations, 2002). The harsh ëlimate makes it 
difficult for especially rural populations to engage in agricultural activities that 
could bring them income. And the narrow economic base (read over-reliance 
on mining), is mainly responsible for the high levels of unemployment in the 
country. Whereas ,minerals accounted, for the bulk of Botswana's Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), mining is not labour intensive and provides only 3.5 
percent of formal employment (BIDPA, 1997; United Nations, 2002; 
Siphambe, 2003). The situation is worsened by the weak informal sector with 
low levels of self-employment. Other factors exacerbating poverty in 
Botswana include weakening of traditional support systems (e.g., loaning of 
animals, pooling of resources, share cropping, communal production, and the 
decline of the traditional extended family system); continuing movement of 
people from rural to urban areas in search of non-existent jobs; and the 
growing burden of HIV/AIDS, which has put intolerable strain on families 
who are already struggling to cope (United Nations, 2002). 
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To address the problem of poverty in Botswana, the government has 
experimented with a variety of policies and programmes. These have included 
agricultural entrepreneurship programmes [e.g., the Arable Land Development 
Policy (ALDEP) and the Accelerated Rain-fed Arable Programme (ARAP)]; 
financial assistance programmes [e.g., Financial Assistance Policy (FAP), the 
Small Medium and Micro-Enterprises (SMMEs), and, most recently, the 
Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA)]; as well as social 
protection programmes (e.g., destitution allowance, and food baskets). 
Whereas agricultural entrepreneurship programmes aimed to assist or 
subsidize resource-poor farmers with farm implements in order to encourage 
food security and raise income, financial assistance programmes have been 
designed to offer grants to citizens that would assist them to set up or expand 
private businesses in order to create more employment through diversification 
of the economy, away from mining and beef industries (Ministry of Finance 
and Development Planning, 1995; http://www.un.org/esaJagenda21/natlinfo/  
countr/botswanalsocial.htm; Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1998). On 
the other hand, social protection programmes are geared toward assisting 
vulnerable (destitute) persons in the community to meet their daily needs. The 
government of Botswana has also tried in a number of ways to eradicate 
poverty through diversification of the economy away from mining and beef 
industries, which it has made a top priority for some years now. This approach 
is based on the idea that for any national poverty alleviation strategy to be 
successful it must operate within a macro-economic framework that ensures 
stability and sustained economic growth (United Nations, 2002). The policy 
aims to boost employment and at he same time to reduce thecountry's risk of 
depending too heavily on a single commodity (i.e., diamonds). Despite the 
wide spectrum of government policies and programmes, the level of poverty in 
Botswana remains high. 
Closely related to high rate of poverty is the high unemployment rate. A 1987 
International Labour Organization (ILO) put the unemployment rate in 
Botswana in 1984/5 at 25.3 percent. A comparable rate of 23.8 percent was 
recorded by the 2002/2003 Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
conducted by the Central Statistics Office (2004:14). These figures show that 
in a period of about 20 years the unemployment level in Botswana remained 
almost unchanged with only a 1.5 percent drop from 1984 to 2003. Young 
people, including those with college diplomas and University degrees, are the 
most affected by the unemployment problem. With the exception of the 
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technical and professional areas such ehgineering, medicine, accounting and 
law, most areas of employment are now saturated. The public service, which is 
the dominant employer of school, college and university graduates, cannot 
offer jobs to the majority of job seekers. Even the teaching profession - the 
major consumer of graduates in the humanities is getting clogged up. As 
pointed out earlier, Botswana is experiencing a shortage in educational places, 
particularly in tertiary institutions such as colleges and university. 
The competition for resources in Botswana is likely to be aggravated by an 
emerging socioeconomic trend that is engulfing particularly the ruling elite 
and the upper and middle class members of the society. Evidently, these 
groups are now embracing the second phase of capitalist development at the 
individual level, that is, they are moving beyond the satisfaction of basic needs 
to embrace the pride inherent in the personal accumulation of resources. For 
example, many no longer just desire to own a home in town and one in the 
rural village of origin, but seek to possess other homes and productive assets 
such as land to be judged successful. This creates a quest for private 
accumulation resulting in an artificial shortage in major resources that 
increases the chances for ethnic-based competition. With specific reference to 
land, the policy that a Motswana can apply for and be allocated land anywhere 
in the country is beginning to raise ethnic tensions in villages adjacent to urban 
centres. The situation in the Mogoditshane and Tlokweng villages, which 
border Gaborone, the capital city, is illustrative. As the concept of 
sub-urbanisation gets entrenched, more and more members of the tribes 
originally occupying these villages are finding themselves landless as the 
urban elite - in many cases not originating from that area - scramble to acquire 
plots at the periphery. 
Whatever path Botswana chooses to take, ethnicity is going to be a major 
feature in the social, economic, and political fabric of the society in the years 
ahead. As a matter of fact, the situation profiled by Glickman (1992: 22) with 
respect to the Afri.can continent as a whole is beginning to take shape in 
Botswana, particularly as resources dwindle. Glickman argues that in Africa, 
when it pertains to issues of political, social, and economic concerns, there 
tends to be an overriding loyalty to group interest vis-à-vis other ethnic 
groups, i.e. people generally advance the interests of their own ethnic group 
rather than those of the nation. According to Glickman (1992), employment is 
one area where ethnic interests take precedence over national solidarity. 
Nevertheless, one cannot argue with certainty that Botswana will join the 
ranks of other African countries which are characterized by unending ethnic 
tensions and conflicts. However, the problem can neither be wished away nor 
swept under the rug. Ethnicity is likely to occupy a prominent role in group 
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dynamics in the future. 
There are three major lessons that we can learn from the Botswana case. First, 
that ethnic diversity does not necessarily lead to ethnic tensions and conflict. 
Botswana is a multiple ethnicity country which has experienced ethnic peace 
and harmony until the late 1990s. Second, the Botswana case refutes the view 
espoused by some African political leaders - such as Daniel Arap Moi, a 
former president of Kenya, and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda - that 
hatred-laden ethnicity in postcolonial Africa is the offshoot of multiparty 
democracy. Those who espouse this view have argued thatdemocratization 
tends to promote opportunities for the expansion of ethnic conflict,, because 
having more than one ethnic group demands pulling in different directions, 
thereby leading to conflict. More often than not, political parties are essentially 
ethnic coalitions that do not reflect a national outlook, and thus electoral 
mobilization breeds ethnic divisions and political instability. Botswana 
however, has been a multiparty democacy since independence. The country 
never rushed to change its constitution to introduce a one-party state as it 
happened in most other African countries which were spared from the military 
coups that swept through the continent in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, it was not 
until the late 1990s   that evidence of ethnic resentment began to emerge in 
Botswaria. 
Third and most importantly, the Botswana case underlines that it is the 
scramble for scarce resources which is the major basis of ethnic tensions, 
competition, and conflict. The emergence of ethnic badmouthing in the late 
1990s was clearly a function of dwindling resources and especially of scarce 
employment opportunities. This is evident from the media debates which 
overwhelmingly focused on the labour market. Indeed, in light of this fact one 
may argue that while ethnic-based political parties remain an indisputable fact 
of the political terrain in Africa, it is not the mere existence of multiple ethnic 
groups in a nation .state that is directly responsible for the formation of the 
same (Munyae and Mulinge 1999). Rather, it is the fear of economic and 
consequently political and social domination of a group or several groups by 
another group or a coalition of other groups that is mainly to blame for the 
existence of ethnic political parties. The postcolonial African state has 
perfected the use of ethnicity in the allocation of scarce resources such as 
government jobs and educational opportunities. As such, tribal parties are an 
attempt by the various ethnic groups to wrestle power from dominant groups 
and open the resource gates to their members. Unfortunately, the rebirth of 
multiparty democracy in most countries in the 1990s occurred in an 
environment that was already highly charged with disintegrative ethnic 
sentiments characterized by repressed rivalry over resource allocation. 
Conclusion and the way forward 
Lessons from the rest of Africa tend to suggest that once it is deeply rooted, 
disintegrative ethnicity - like corruption - is hard to eradicate. For Botswana to 
escape the destructive and counterproductive ethnic tensions and conflict that 
have rocked many African countries since independence, the political 
leadership must adopt a more progressive and open approach toward 
disintegrative ethnicity. The tendency thus far has been for the top level 
political echelon to adopt a "strategy of denial" in dealing with what is 
potentially an explosive problem. For instance, the country's president has 
previously dismissed ethnicity as something that was being peddled by 
academics (see Mmegi, The Reporter, August 4, 2002: 2). According to him, 
Batswana lived together harmoniously, but some elites wanted to use ethnicity 
to their own advantage. This is a common approach to the ethnic question 
across most of Africa: Nearly everywhere political leaders denounce the 
existence of tribalism in their country because ethnicity is destructive to their 
ideals of national unity. 
Across Africa, attempts to build cohesive nations devoid of ethnic tensions 
and animosities have varied widely. One commonly utilized method has been 
the search for a common lingua franca or a national language to replace 
multiple local languages (Birch, 1989). For instance, in Kenya and Tanzania 
Kiswahili was declared a national language, while in Botswana Setswana 
assumed a similar status. Such languages have, nevertheless, failed to excite a 
fully-fledged mass sentiment towards unity among dispersed and culturally 
heterogeneous populations (Smith, 1981), as most ethnic groups have been 
able to retain their distinctive linguistic and cultural identities even after being 
schooled in the chosen national language. Another approach to the ethnicity 
problem has been state control of the mass media, accompanied by the spread 
of propaganda by the state and censorship of what the press could disseminate 
to the public (Birch, 1989). Some countries (such as Kenya) have also 
experimented with outlawing tribal welfare associations, arguing that these 
perpetuated unhealthy ethnic consciousness, while others tried the 
cdnstitutional banning of multiple political parties to create single party states, 
arguing that such parties tended to coalesce along ethnic lines, thereby 
solidifying rather than weakening ethnic competition and fragmentation 
(Mazrui and Tidy, 1984). Unfortunately, these measures have failed to 
produce the desired results in virtually all cases. 
A more realistic approach to the ethnicity question in Botswana should be one 
anchored in the acknowledgement, as opposed to denial, on the part of the 
state and community leaders, that ethnic consciousness is becoming a major 
factor in socio-economic and political processes of the Tswana society, and 
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that new strategies are necessary to keep it under control. To effectively 
address the problem of surging ethnic consciousness, Botswana must draw 
from the experiences of other African countries and from its own history to 
avoid making the same mistakes that have been responsible for the 
intensification of ethnic competition. The country can draw valuable lessons 
from the experiences of other countries such as Kenya and Nigeria which are 
bedevilled by ethnic competition and animosities, and from a re-examination 
of past strategies utilized internally to foster national cohesion. For instance, 
rising ethnic consciousness in the country suggests that previous approaches 
which emphasized using language to create a unified nation no longer offer a 
lasting solution to the problem. They could also indicate that the harmonious 
ethnic relations that. Botswana has enjoyed in the past are due to factors other 
than such deliberate steps. 
A thorough and clear understanding of the different factors that are responsible 
for the surging ethnic consciousness in Botswana is central to devising 
appropriate intervention strategies. For such an understanding to be attained, it 
is imperative that people talk to each other and decisions are made through 
debate and compromise. In particular, since ethnic consciousness is at its 
formative stages, the state should dialogue more directly with the aggrieved 
parties to understand the basis for their concerns, and to articulate its stance 
with respect to the resolution of the situation. Through dialogue and collective 
decision making suspicions and resistance emanating from state decisions 
could be eliminated. Botswana appeared to have embraced the path of 
dialogue when the state allowed debate about sections 77, 78, and 79 of the 
constitution to flourish, culminating in the appointment of the Balopi 
Commission to collect public views and make appropriate recommendations. 
The commission was testimony to the state's willingness to listen to its people. 
However, subsequent decisions by the state to shelve, rather than implement, 
the recommendatiohs of the Balopi Commission, could be construed to be a 
pointer to the state's support of the view that some tribes are more important 
than others, which ultimately undermines public confidence in the state's 
commitment to dialogue and collective decision-making. By not implementing 
the recommendations of the commission, Botswana joined the ranks of other 
African countries which have treated commissions of enquiry as instruments 
for cover up and/or suppression of socio-politically charged issues. 
In addition, considering whose interests may be served through intervention is 
important. This is particularly so in light of the fact that Botswana has 
legislated ethnicity by demarcating eight principal tribes in its constitution 
through sections 77, 78, and 79. Since the legitimacy of these sections has 
previously been questioned (a situation that led to the Balopi Commission), 
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state intervention that appears tilted toward the eight principal tribes would 
amount to crushing some groups while lifting those the state considers to be 
important. This is more likely to aggravate rather than ameliorate the situation 
by rousing suspicion and creating further disenchantment among 'minority' 
tribes. Where it is necessary for interventions to be targeted at specific ethnic 
groups, the state must explain meticulously the rationale behind its actions and 
involve the leadership from other groups, especially those which are likely to 
treat the initiative with suspicion. 
The state in Botswana should not pay lip service to, or play political 
correctness with, interventions to curb rising ethnic consciousness. This is a 
mistake than many .other African countries have committed in the past with 
disastrous results. The continent is replete with governments that have 
preached loudly against ethnic-based discriminations, while at the same time 
presiding over the entrenchment of ethnicity as a major factor in public service 
appointments and the distribution of national resources for socio-economic 
development. Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki offers classic 
examples. Rather than to follow such a route, the state in Botswana should 
ensure that intervention is based on a long-term commitment to the attainment 
and preservation of ethnic cohesion. This should prevail regardless of the party 
or the individuals wielding political power at any particular time. 
Unfortunately, the experience with the Balopi commission, which 
categorically recommended the repealing of sections 77, 78, and 79 from the 
constitution, points to a state that is bent on paying lip service to and/or 
playing political correctness with the ethnicity question. 
In order to diffuse ethnic tensions and possible conflict in Botswana it is also 
important for the state to address culturally based perceptions. This is 
consistent with Fisher's (1998) position that the mindsets or cultural lenses 
with which the disputing parties - as well as the interveners - view the subject 
are crucial to understanding and responding to their concerns. For instance, 
rather than to adopt a blanket approach to rising ethnic consciousness, the state 
must address separately the push by some ethnic pressure groups like the 
Society for the Promotion of the Ikalanga Language (SPIL) for the recognition 
of their culture. This could occur through activities such as the teaching of 
native languages. In the same vein, the more politically motivated concerns 
about the institutionalization of ethnicity through sections 77, 78 and 79 of the 
Botswana constitution and concerns related to the more equitable distribution 
of resources, particularly employment opportunities, must be addressed 
separately, based on merit. Finally, to check rising ethnic cOnsciousness in 
Botswana, the state should create greater values that unite rather than divide 
the people. The development of a national language, though important, does 
not offer the ultimate answer in this regard. A constitutional order that ensures 
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that resources are equitably distributed in the country would be far more 
important. Given the rising unemployment, there is a need to guarantee that 
appointments to public office are done on technical cognisance of merit and 
equity, and that previous attempts by the state to distribute the proceeds from 
Botswana's natural resources evenly are improved. In a similar vein, the 
recommendations of the Balopi Commission that sections 77, 78 and 79 of the 
Constitution be repealed should be implemented without further delay to 
restore public confidence that the state does not consider any ethnic groups in 
the country to be more privileged than others. 
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